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Paul Krugman 
To  someone who looked only at the aggregate numbers, it would be hard to 
explain the U.S. preoccupation with Japan. Only about one-fifth of U.S. im- 
ports come from Japan, and little more than one-tenth of  our exports are sent 
there; Japanese firms account for only about 20 percent of the stock of  foreign 
direct investment in the United States, and still employ only a relative handful 
of  U.S. workers. Japan is an important trade and investment partner, but Eu- 
ropean trade and investment are more important to the United States by any 
measure and by most measures even Canada bulks larger. Yet for most Amer- 
icans-not  just the general public, but policymakers and academics as well- 
Japanese trade and investment are the central international economic issue. 
No doubt much of the focus on Japan represents a mixture of fascination 
and envy. Fascination, because of Japan’s remarkable rise from relative back- 
wardness and crushing military defeat to an extraordinary position of financial 
and increasingly  technological leadership.  Envy, because this rise stands in 
sharp contrast to the gradual decline of  U.S. preeminence,  which has been 
accompanied by  stagnation or even decline in the living  standards of  large 
numbers of  American residents. To an important extent Japan stands out be- 
cause it is a symbol of America’s shortcomings, of the disappointing failure 
of our economy to deliver what we hoped it would. 
But  there  is  more  to the  “Japan  issue”  than  American  sourness  over a 
second-place showing.  There is also a widespread  sense that as Japan has 
moved from the periphery to the center of the world economy, it has continued 
to  play the game by  somewhat different rules than other advanced nations. 
Rightly or wrongly, more and more opinion leaders in the United States have 
come to  the  view  that Japan’s  economy  simply  functions  differently  from 
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those of other industrial countries-and  that as a result the traditional  tools 
and stance of U.S. international economic policy, which worked well enough 
in a world in which Japan was a minor player, are now no longer good enough. 
Only some of those who emphasize the Japanese challenge are “bashers,” urg- 
ing the United States to get tough; others are simply admirers, who want the 
United States to emulate what they perceive to be the Japanese system. 
The problem is that, while the debate over U.S.-Japanese trade and invest- 
ment relations has generated a remarkable amount of heat, facts and serious 
analysis are still in short supply. Preoccupied with the latest wave of Japanese 
exports or investments,  the debate has done little to resolve the basic ques- 
tions:  In what way does the Japanese economic system differ from those of 
other industrial countries? What are the effects of these differences? Do they 
pose problems for amicable economic relations? What can be done to resolve 
the tensions? 
In the fall of 1989 a group of Japanese and U.S. participants held a confer- 
ence at the National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Massachu- 
setts, to discuss a number of the key issues in the economic relationship be- 
tween the United States and Japan. This volume is the result. In introducing 
the volume, I want to begin with some background to the debate, then review 
the main issues that arose in the conference. 
Defining the Japan Issue 
To  Japanese government officials and to a considerable number of econo- 
mists and other observers, the U.S.  preoccupation with Japanese differences 
seems unwarranted. In terms of the conventional measures  of  international 
economic policy, Japan is not too exceptional. Agriculture is highly protected, 
by most measures more so than in any other industrial country; but because 
Japan  remains an  agricultural  importer,  its  food protectionism  creates  less 
strain on the trading  system  than the  massive export subsidies of  Europe’s 
Common Agricultural Policy. Meanwhile, Japan’s tariff rates on manufactured 
goods, like those of other advanced countries,  are quite low.  And Japan has 
hardly any of the voluntary export restraint agreements that limit shipment of 
many manufactured  goods into both  the United States and Europe. Looking 
only at the de jure structure of trade policy, one would not be surprised to find 
Japanese officials claiming, as they often do, that Japan has freer trade than 
the United States. 
Few people in the U.S. policy community, however, accept this benign in- 
terpretation.  A few still hold to the view of a monolithic “Japan, Inc.” More 
common, however,  is a conventional  wisdom that runs something like this: 
despite its relative absence of legal barriers to trade, the Japanese market is de 
facto protected because it is not competitive in the same way as those of other 
countries. Collusive behavior involving both firms and a highly cartelized dis- 
tribution  sector effectively  shut out many  foreign  products,  even  when  the 3  Introduction 
imports would be cheaper and/or of higher quality than the Japanese version. 
Foreign direct investment is similarly choked .off  by  an inability to get local 
business cooperation, and the inability to establish local subsidiaries inhibits 
exports to Japan. And this more or less conspiratorial system tends particu- 
larly to close ranks when a key new technology is at stake, assuring Japanese 
firms of a chance to capture new markets even when foreign firms have an 
initial lead. 
What is the basis for this conventional wisdom about Japan? Much of the 
public case rests on anecdotal evidence-on  the stories of businessmen who 
claim that they could not sell demonstrably superior goods in Japan. Influen- 
tial commentators on Japanese society, like Karel van  Wolferen, have rein- 
forced the anecdotes by  offering a portrait of a society very much unlike the 
freewheeling individualism of the United States or even Western Europe. To 
economists, however, this is not enough. Anecdotes are useful, but not con- 
clusive-especially  when the tellers of  the anecdotes are by  no means dis- 
interested.  Sociology is important, but economists  tend to be skeptical of 
suggestions that social factors lead to a systematic disregard for profit oppor- 
tunities. In other words, to be persuaded by  the conventional wisdom econo- 
mists would need to be convinced, first, that the anecdotes are borne out by 
harder, preferably quantitative, evidence and, second, that the supposed pref- 
erence of Japanese buyers for more expensive domestic products makes some 
kind of economic sense. 
For much of  the 1980s, economic controversy over Japanese performance 
concentrated on a rather crude question: Does Japan import abnormally few 
manufactures? In terms of  raw numbers, Japan looks clearly different from 
other advanced countries, with 1988 imports of manufactures of only about 2 
percent of GNP, versus 7 percent for the United States and 14 percent for the 
average European Community (EC) nation. On the face of it this comparison 
seems to confirm the anecdotal evidence of a closed domestic market. But as 
many economists-perhaps  most notably Bergsten and Cline-have  pointed 
out, this raw comparison is unfair.’ The United States is a resource-rich na- 
tion, able to pay for its oil imports by exporting agricultural products; Japan 
must pay  for its raw materials by  running a trade surplus in manufactures, 
presumably in part by  importing less. European countries do more than half 
their manufactures trade with each other; Japan has no neighboring advanced 
nations. 
A number of economists have tried to ask whether, taking these factors into 
account, Japan still looks like an outlier. The models used to answer this ques- 
tion are themselves the subject of dispute; Srinivasan and Hamada have ar- 
gued that the whole process of  testing for abnormalities in trade is flawed.2 
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Nonetheless, it seems fair to argue that, in  the general debate, the view that 
Japan does import less than one might have expected wins on points. Particu- 
larly influential was  a paper by  Lawrence that  suggested that, after taking 
resources and location into account, Japan still imports only a little more than 
half as much manufactures as one would otherwise e~pect.~ 
Another piece of  loose supportive evidence for the conventional view of 
Japan as a closed economy comes from looking at foreign direct investment. 
In  the United States, foreign-owned firms now  produce about 4 percent of 
GNP and more than  10 percent of  manufacturing value added; in  European 
nations the percentages are substantially higher, while in  Japan the role of 
foreign production is negligible. 
On the whole, then, the conventional wisdom survives crude empirical test- 
ing more or less intact. But this only raises further questions. Why does an 
economy that is de jure open appear to remain relatively closed? Is there an 
economic rationale for Japanese behavior? Or, alternatively, will Japan in fu- 
ture begin to look more like other industrial nations? 
Japanese Trade Patterns 
Three of the papers presented at the conference and included in this volume 
represent, in effect, a continuation of the debate over the openness of  the Jap- 
anese economy. 
Robert Z. Lawrence offers some new  kinds of  evidence on the ways  in 
which Japan’s economy interacts with the rest of the world. Instead of fiddling 
further with data on the volume of  imports, he brings several other kinds of 
data to bear. One  is price data: he shows that prices of  many manufactured 
goods within the Japanese market are much  higher than they  are abroad, 
seemingly confirming the supposition that the Japanese market is  de facto 
protected in spite of the absence of conventional barriers. A second piece of 
evidence is the role of intrafirm trade. Lawrence points out that if the mecha- 
nism that blocks imports relies essentially on collusion among firms, then 
products of Japanese subsidiaries abroad should find it easier to enter the Jap- 
anese market-and  he finds that indeed Japanese imports are marked by  an 
unusually high volume of intrafirm trade. 
Lawrence also draws attention to a new development: the surge of manufac- 
tures imports into Japan since the rise of  the yen in  1985-87.  That surge, 
starting from such a low base, still leaves import penetration in  Japan well 
below U.S. or European levels. But it shows that access to the Japanese mar- 
ket is not completely insensitive to incentives-that  the implicit barriers to 
imports are more like tariffs than quotas. 
Peter A.  Petri focuses more specifically on the developments in Japanese 
3. R. Lawrence, “Imports in Japan: Closed Markets or Minds?” Brookings Papers on Economic 
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trade since the onset of the strong yen. He finds that import growth in manu- 
factures has proceeded more rapidly than estimates from the pre-1985 period 
would have predicted. To  some extent the unexpected surge in  imports has 
been concentrated in imports from East Asian NICs, but Petri finds that this 
trend is too modest to justify talk of an emerging yen bloc. 
Petri follows a different approach from Lawrence in trying to understand 
the  sources of  traditional low  imports into Japan; that  is, he asks whether 
cross-sectional variation in import penetration corresponds to industrial orga- 
nization in the way that the conventional wisdom predicts. Broadly speaking, 
he finds that it does. While the principal determinant of Japanese trade pat- 
terns in manufactured goods seems to be technology intensity, imports do tend 
to be lower when collusive insider relationships are most plausible, that is, 
when  the government is the customer, when goods are sold to other busi- 
nesses, or when high distribution margins suggest a noncompetitive distribu- 
tion sector. 
Yung Chul Park and Won-Am Park pursue further the recent increase in 
Japanese imports of manufactured goods from East Asian nations. Like Petri, 
they find clear evidence of  a structural shift toward more Japanese imports 
from Western Pacific developing countries.  As  Lawrence’s analysis would 
have suggested, however, they  find that Japanese foreign direct investment 
plays a key role in this shift: NIC and NIE exports seem to get into Japan 
largely because they originate in Japanese-controlled firms. Park  and Park 
also find that the changes in East Asian trade patterns remain far too limited 
to envision the emergence of a yen trading bloc anytime soon. 
Market Structure and lkade 
The next three papers focus on the question of  market structure in Japan, 
and how it may affect international trade. 
Richard C. Marston uses data on pricing behavior of firms as a clue to the 
functioning of markets. He shows that Japanese firms engage in strong “pric- 
ing to market”: cutting the yen prices of exports, but not of the same goods 
delivered to domestic markets,  when the yen rises. This pricing to market 
reveals two important facts about Japanese manufacturing firms. First,  the 
firms behave strategically, not at all like the atomistic competitors assumed in 
much of  the empirical testing of hypotheses about trade. Second, the firms 
evidently are able to segment markets, charging very different prices at home 
and abroad. 
Marston also shows that structural change has proceeded at a rapid rate 
within the Japanese manufacturing sector, with sharp trends in relative prices 
associated with  differential rates of  productivity growth.  This observation 
helps explain why there appears to be a secular upward trend in the equilib- 
rium real yen-a  theme that comes back later in Jeffrey Frankel’s paper. 
Japan’s distribution system has attracted much foreign attention. With its 6  Introduction 
proliferation of small stores and many layers of  wholesaling,  the system ap- 
pears inefficient to outsiders; it is also accused of fostering vertical  relation- 
ships  that  effectively  close the  Japanese  market  to  foreigners.  Two  of  the 
papers  presented  here,  by  Takatoshi  Ito and Masayoshi  Maruyama  and by 
Motoshige Itoh, examine this distribution system. 
Ito and Maruyama focus on the question of efficiency. Somewhat surpris- 
ingly, they do not find much evidence of striking inefficiency: although there 
are many shops and many layers, the overall level of employment per unit of 
final sales is not out of line with other industrial countries. Nor is the retailing 
and distribution  markup exceptionally  high.  In essence, Ito and Maruyama 
suggest that Japan’s distribution system uses a different ownership structure to 
do pretty much the same things that are done elsewhere. 
Itoh focuses instead on the question of market structure. He documents the 
substantial extent to which Japanese distribution does in fact engage in prac- 
tices that appear noncompetitive to U.S. eyes. But he points out that many of 
these practices can be rationalized  as responses to problems of  imperfect in- 
formation, especially in the context of a legal system that makes formal con- 
tracts less feasible, and long-term relationships correspondingly more impor- 
tant, than in the United States. 
Financial Markets 
In the last few years, Japan has emerged as a spectacular financial power- 
house: the world’s largest investor, with a stock market that rivals or surpasses 
America’s  in  value,  and-very  lately-a  scene of wild  fluctuation  in asset 
values that belie any image of a tightly controlled society where everything is 
under central direction. 
Two of the papers in the conference, by David M. Meerschwam and Jeffrey 
A. Frankel, focus on Japanese financial markets: Meerschwam on institutional 
structure and Frankel on prices. 
Meerschwam highlights the special role, via the keiretsu, of  Japan’s banks 
in  industrial  structure. He points  out that  there  is an important  distinction 
between  the forces that gave rise to the  special role of large banks and the 
function  that these banks play.  It was to an important extent the controlled 
economy of early postwar Japan that pushed banks into a key role: controlled 
interest rates meant that access to credit became crucial to business success, 
leading to the predominance  of industry groups clustered around banks.  Yet 
this institutional arrangement turned out to have other benefits: because banks 
were uniquely  situated to monitor their firms and resolve problems of  infor- 
mation, Japanese industry was allowed to adopt a long-run view rather than to 
appease stockholders by focusing on the bottom line. 
Meerschwam points out, however, that the traditional structure of Japanese 
financial markets is under strain and may indeed be on its way out. Deregula- 
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undermined the automatic special role of  banks,  and a more Anglo-Saxon 
style system may be emerging. Interestingly, Meerschwam suggests that this 
increase in competition may not be a desirable thing, that even though firms 
may voluntarily move away from the old style of finance they may collectively 
lose as a result. 
Frankel addresses instead the question of  asset prices. In particular, why 
did Japanese land and stock prices move to such high levels in the 1980s? 
Frankel first argues that the high ratio of prices to earnings in Japan can be 
explained to a significant degree, though not entirely, by two factors: low real 
interest rates and high growth prospects. He makes the important point that 
real interest rates internationally are not necessarily equalized by arbitrage: if 
a country is expected to show persistent real appreciation, then it will have a 
low  real interest rate even in an integrated world capital market. Since this 
appears to be true of Japan, for reasons touched upon by Marston’s paper, high 
asset prices should be expected. 
If this is true, however, why did the boom come in the 1980s and not be- 
fore? Here Frankel appeals to the institutional changes that Meerschwam iden- 
tified. Under  the traditional financial system,  savings were channeled into 
business investment and were not available to bid up prices of financial assets. 
With the erosion of that system, the underlying reasons for high asset prices 
have been able to assert themselves. 
Industrial and nade  Policy 
The final two papers of  this volume,  by  Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and 
Amelia Porges, treat the role of government in Japan’s trade relations. 
Okuno-Fujiwara traces the history of Japan’s industrial policy. Echoing the 
discussion of financial markets, he points to the gradual evolution of that pol- 
icy away from dirigisme. At one time, control over the allocation of rationed 
credit and foreign exchange gave the idea of “Japan, Inc.” some reality. Since 
the  early  1970s, however, the role of  government guidance has shifted to 
something more modest and subtle. In part, government acts in ways perfectly 
acceptable to a neoclassical economist, attempting through such activities as 
technology promotion to overcome problems of external economies with their 
resulting divergence between private and social returns. He also emphasizes 
the role of  government policy  in helping the private sector form consistent 
expectations-in  effect, arguing that  the Japanese government is now  en- 
gaged to an important extent in noncoercive indicative planning. 
In the final paper of  the conference,  Porges takes us from the world of 
analytics to that of actual trade policy, with a blow-by-blow account of  the 
trade negotiations between the United States and Japan. Her paper reminds us 
of the difficulty of converting academic assessments into operational demands 
and  of  the importance of  interest group politics in  both countries.  For an 
American her paper is, in particular, a useful reminder that Japan is not only a 8  Introduction 
major economic power but also a real country, with real politics, no more able 
to deliver sweeping change on demand than we are ourselves. 
Lessons of the Conference 
This conference was not intended to deliver immediate policy advice. In- 
stead, it aimed to provide new evidence on the truth about Japan and its eco- 
nomic relationship with the United States. What did we learn? I would stress 
three main themes. 
First, Japan is different. That part of the conventional wisdom that empha- 
sizes sharp institutional differences between Japanese and  U.S.  markets is 
clearly borne out by many of the papers, in everything from the pricing behav- 
ior of exporters to the financial role of banks. 
Second, in some ways Japanese difference does contribute to trade tension 
(which is not the same thing as saying that it is in any sense “unfair”). Japan 
does appear to be marked by a style of relationships between firms that makes 
it difficult for outsiders, including foreigners, to break in. 
Third, this Japanese difference in many cases appears to make sense-that 
is, there are real efficiency advantages to the Japanese style of business, aris- 
ing from the virtues of long-term relationships in a world of incomplete infor- 
mation. Even where it is commonly supposed that Japan is very inefficient, 
this conference showed some surprising performance. We  must therefore be 
cautious about  lecturing Japan  about  noncompetitive practices:  they  may 
know what they are doing. 
Fourth, Japan itself is changing. Imports of  manufactured goods are in- 
creasing; financial markets are becoming less distinctive. We  should beware 
of applying stereotypes from a decade ago to the very different Japan that is 
now emerging. 